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Abstract
The increasing popular support for Islamist parties in democratic countries 
incites public suspicion concerning whether the Islamists’ participation in 
procedural democracy guarantees their commitment for substantial democracy, 
which in principle requires equality of  rights among citizens regardless of  
their religion and gender. Indeed, gender politics often appears at the centre of  
the lslamist agenda, as they seek to construct a new moral order based on a 
conservative gender perspective. A greater concern arises on whether the Islamists 
will eventually lead society towards democracy or, conversely, towards theocracy. 
In Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) 
shows a remarkable development and significant electoral achievement. Some 
observers viewed that PKS is opportunistically using democratic means to 
“hijack” it for their Islamist agenda waiting for when political power is in 
their hands. Others believe PKS’s involvement in real politics will, in the end, 
lead to a “gradual secularisation” of  their Islamist agenda. Based on a gender 
analysis, this paper examines whether PKS’s fulfillment of  the formalist criteria 
of  democracy is compatible with their application of  democratic principles 
and values.
[Semakin menguatnya dukungan terhadap partai Islam memincu kecurigaan 
publik yang mempertanyakan apakah partisipasi kalangan islamis dalam 
demokrasi prosedural menjamin komitmen mereka bagi tegaknya demokrasi 
substansial, demokrasi yang mensyaratkan kesetaraan bagi semua orang 
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tanpa terkecuali. Sebenarnya, agenda politik gender yang didengungkan oleh 
kalangan islamis tidak bisa dilepaskan dari perspektif  konservatif  mereka 
mengenai relasi gender. Pertanyaannya kemudian, apakah yang mereka 
agendakan akan berlabuh pada pemantapan demokrasi atau --sebaliknya - - 
menuju teokrasi. Di Indonesia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) adalah 
satu-satunya partai Islam di Indonesia yang berhasil berkembang pesat dan 
mampu mendulang suara secara signifikan. Bagi beberapa pengamat, PKS 
merepresentasikan partai Islamis yang berhasil “menunggangi” demokrasi 
untuk memperjuangkan agenda islamis mereka. Ini akan tampak jelas jika 
PKS berhasil menjadi partai penguasa. Kendati demikian, beberapa kalangan 
lainnya berkeyakinan bahwa keterlibatan PKS dalam politik demokratis 
akan “mensekulerkan” agenda islamis mereka. Dengan analisis gender, 
tulisan ini hendak menjawab apakah kriteria formal mengenai nilai dan 
prinsip demokrasi yang melekat pada PKS sejalan dengan apa yang mereka 
praktekkan.]
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A. Introduction
One of  the major challenges to democratisation in predominantly 
Muslim countries comes from the Islamists’ participation in the legal 
political process. Despite the fact that recent popular uprisings in the 
Middle East were not Islamic revolutions, apparently the Islamists have 
been emerging as the leading political force in the region due to the 
poor performance of  other political organisations. The major fear that 
underlies the Islamists’ participation in democratic process is that their 
acceptance of  democracy is no more than a strategy and instrument to 
obtain power so that they could impose an alternative political system 
when power is in their hands. In other words, suspicion remains on 
whether the Islamists’ participation in procedural democracy guarantees 
their commitment insubstantial democracy, which requires equality of  
rights of  all citizens regardless of  race, religion and gender. 
Primarily, the Islamists perceive Islam as a complete system 
governing all aspects of  life, encompassing all things material and spiritual, 
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societal and individual, political and personal.1 Their ultimate goal, 
therefore, is to establish an Islamic system that ensures the implementation 
of  shari>‘a derived from the Islamic sources of  the Qur’an and Sunna. The 
tension between the Islamists’ conviction in divine sovereignty with the 
concept of  popular sovereignty that constitutes the pillar of  democracy, 
in addition to the terrible democratic performance of  Islamist regimes 
in some Muslim countries, have raised doubts regarding the Islamists’ 
commitment to democratic principles and values. Furthermore, the 
Islamists’ position are often considered ambiguous in several issues 
pertaining to Islamic law, the use of  violence, political pluralism, civil and 
political rights, religious minorities and the rights of  women.2 
Gender violence, in particular, is seen mostly as the immediate 
consequence of  Islamisation schemes wherein women become the first 
and foremost victims of  discrimination and oppression engendered 
by the Islamist agendas.3 Accordingly, the rise of  Islamism is deemed 
responsible for the marginalisation of  women and the restriction of  their 
mobility. In fact, although the Islamists enforce a gender division of  labor 
and sexual segregation, they do not necessarily call for women seclusion. 
Considering the family as the vehicle for the establishment of  the ideal 
Islamic society, which is the ultimate goal of  their political activism, the 
Islamists seek to mobilise women and enhance their participation in the 
public sphere to press forward their Islamist agenda.4 Women’s activism 
on behalf  of  the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), for instance, was pivotal for 
the movement’s achievement as the largest opposition within Egyptian 
1 Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accommodationists Speaks: Goals and Strategies 
of  the Muslim Brotherhood of  Egypt,” International Journal of  Middle East Studies, vol. 
27, no. 3, 1995, p. 323.
2 Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the 
Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 17. 
3 See Hala Shukrallah, ‘The Impact of  the Islamic Movement in Egypt’ in 
Feminist Review, no. 47, 1994; Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The 
Limits of  Postmodern Analysis (London and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 1999); and Norani 
Othman, ‘Muslim Women and the Challenge of  Islamic Fundamentalism/Extremism: 
an Overview of  Southeast Asian Muslim Women’s Struggle for Human Rights and 
Gender Equality,’ Women’s Studies International Forum, no. 29, 2006.
4 See Ghada Hashem Talhami, The Mobilization of  Muslim Women in Egypt (Florida: 
University Press of  Florida, 1996).
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parliament in 2005.5 Women also played a significant role in mobilising 
considerable votes for the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, PKS) in Indonesia.6 
PKS’s remarkable development and electoral achievements have 
been interpreted in various ways. Some observers are pessimistic viewing 
that PKS is opportunistically using democratic political means to hijack 
it for their Islamist agenda when political power is in their hands.7 Other 
scholars are optimistic, viewing PKS as the only party to develop an 
internal culture and organisational discipline that is desirable for the 
proper functioning of  a consolidated democracy.8 The latter assume 
that PKS’s involvement in real politics will eventually lead to a gradual 
secularisation of  their Islamist agenda. In this context, this paper 
examines whether PKS’s accommodation of  the formalist criteria of  
democracy is compatible with their commitment in the substantive value 
of  democracy by looking through a gender specific lens. Here, procedural 
democracy refers to a set of  processes by which a society ensures 
popular participation in governance, while the substantial definition 
of  democracy ties certain values and principles to the functioning of  
democratic processes.
As a religio-political movement, PKS falls into the category of  a 
moderate Islamist group since it ideologically accepts electoral democracy, 
political and ideological pluralism, and aims for a gradual social, political 
and economic changes. Behaviorally, it works within the established 
state institutions and rejects violent methods to achieve its objectives.9 
5 Lisa Blayds and Safinaz El Tarouty, “Women’s Electoral Participation in Egypt: 
The Implications of  Gender for Voter Recruitment and Mobilization,” The Middle East 
Journal, vol. 63, no. 3, 2009, p. 367.
6 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Islamism and Women in Politics: Analyzing Female 
Political Participation and Representation of  Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS),” Jurnal Substansia, vol. 1, no.1, 2009, p. 68.
7 Cited in Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Analysing 
the Islamist Activism of  Indonesia’a Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) from a Social 
Movement Theory Perspective,” Master thesis presented in the Australian National 
University, 2008, p. 7. 
8 Greg Fealy, ‘Foreword’ in Yon Machmudi, Islamizing Indonesia: The Rise of  
Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), (Canberra, ANU Press, 2008), p. xi.
9 Omar Ashour, The De-radicalization of  Jihadits: Transforming Armed Islamist 
Movements (London-New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 4. 
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I observe that as a political institution (jam‘iyyah), PKS is flexible and 
pragmatic in its gender policies. In comparison, as religious movement 
(jama>‘ah), PKS is strict and dogmatist in its gender ideologies. The internal 
dynamic between the conservative wing that are more ideological and the 
progressive wing that are more pragmatic has created ambiguity in PKS’s 
stance pertaining to gender issues. However, the internal leadership’s 
vision and the external pressure for reform will determine PKS’s direction 
toward either real or pseudo democratic principles. 
B. Islamism and Women’s Rights: Sexual Clash of  Civilizations? 
The recent wave of  democratisation in the Middle East seems 
to imply that there is no more evidence for a ‘clash of  civilizations,’ 
a controversial thesis in which Samuel P. Huntington argued that 
democracy -and other Western concepts like individualism, liberalism, 
constitutionalism, secularism, human rights, equality, liberty, and the 
rule of  law-are not applicable in non-Western cultures, particularly 
Islam.10 Ronal Inglehart and Pippa Norris tested this rather simplistic 
and generalised argument, through the World Values Survey (WVS) 
that investigates socio-cultural and political change around the globe.11 
Although confirming Huntington’s cultural approach that religious 
traditions play a key role in the formation of  social norms and values, 
Inglehart and Norris dissent from his opinion by arguing that the values 
separating Western and Islamic civilizations have much more to do with 
gender equality and sexual liberalisation than democracy.12 In other 
words, it is the clash of  ‘eros’ instead of  ‘demos.’ Although most Muslim 
societies support democracy, according to this survey they do not favor 
equal rights and opportunities for women and disapprove of  divorce, 
abortion and homosexuality. 
The ‘sexual clash of  civilization’ theory receives little attention 
because there is no consensus among scholars on whether sexual liberty 
is a prerequisite for democracy. Charles K. Rowley and Nathanael Smith 
suggest that the lack of  religious freedom, instead of  sexual freedom, 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of  Civilizations?,” Foreign Affair, vol. 72, 
no. 3, 1993, p. 40.
11 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The True Clash of  Civilizations,” Foreign 
Policy, no. 135, 2003, p. 64.
12 Ibid., p. 65.
Lanny Octavia
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2012 M/1433 H6
lead to a democratic deficit in Muslim-majority countries.13 They were 
unsure nevertheless whether gender-specific rights have to do with the 
ability of  a country to sustain a political system wherein people can hire 
and fire their leaders through the ballot box. In this regard, Shahra Razavi 
reveals the feminist critique that the liberal notion of  rights has excluded 
the important domain of  social life --the private sphere of  marriage and 
family life-- from democratic scrutiny.14 For this reason, the feminists 
campaign ‘the personal is political’ to emphasise what happens within 
women’s personal lives as a political issue that necessitate attention from 
the state, such as in the matters of  domestic violence, reproductive rights 
and child care for example. 
The Islamists, by contrast, are excessively preoccupied with 
family issues and the regulation of  the private domain including 
sexuality, marriage and gender roles. Sexual politics become the centre 
of  the lslamist agenda,15 which seek the reordering of  society and the 
construction of  a new moral order based on a gender discourse derived 
from literal, non-contextual and patriarchal interpretations of  Islamic 
texts. The sexual division of  labor, the inegalitarian nature in the matters 
of  marriage, divorce and inheritance, and the restriction on women’s 
leadership and sexuality are seen as indicators of  the misogynist gender 
politics of  the Islamists. ‘The private’ here is indeed political, and has 
become increasingly politicized.16
Nevertheless, the Islamists’ gender perspective is neither static nor 
monolithic. It is continuously changing over time and varied according 
to the context. In Egypt, for instance, Sherifa Zuhur observed how the 
Islamists’ gender ideology become flexible since their aspiration for 
social change necessitates mass mobilisation. Their message concerning 
13 Charles K. Rowley and Nathanael Smith, “Islam’s Democracy Paradox: 
Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?,” Public Choice, 2009, 
no. 139, p. 294.
14 Shahra Razavi, “Women in Contemporary Democratization,” International 
Journal of  Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 15, no. 1, 2001, p. 202.
15 See Nilufer Narli, Unveiling the Fundamentalist Women: a Case Study of  University 
Students in Malaysia (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1991); John Stratton Hawley, Fundamentalism 
and Gender (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
16 Shahra Razavi and Anne Jenichen, “The Unhappy Marriage of  Religion and 
Politics: Problems and Pitfalls for Gender Equality,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 
6, 2010, p. 835.
Islamism and Democracy
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2012 M/1433 H 7
women appears in various versions, depending on whether the audience 
is internal or external to the movement. There is also disparity between 
the Islamists’ gender theory and practice, as they tolerate deviation from 
their ideal norms in certain areas like education, employment, family 
planning, child rearing and family relations.17 In Jordan, Lisa Taraki found 
that the Islamists’ official and popular discourse pertaining to women 
indeed remained conservative although the changing circumstances 
required reformulations. On the contrary, interestingly, the Islamists’ 
practice concerning women is constantly in a state of  negotiation, 
contestation, redefinition, and experimentation.18 Anthony Bubalo, Greg 
Fealy and Whit Mason viewed that such an ideological shift is driven 
by a calculation of  what might be gained by playing within the rules of  
democratic politics and is the logical conclusion of  a decision to pursue 
goals through participatory rather than revolutionary processes.19 
C. Gender Discourse of  PKS: between Equality and Equity
Throughout her in-depth study on the gender discourse of  the 
Islamist ideologues including the Muslim Brotherhood’s influential figures 
Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Zaynab al-Ghazali, Lamia Rustum 
Shehadeh identified three common elements within the Islamist discourse 
on women. First, domesticity as women’s primary role; second, the physical, 
physiological, biological, and psychological differences between the sexes 
are viewed as universal and immutable, dictating parallel differences in 
the respective roles of  husband and wife, although they both spiritually 
equal; third, an element of  danger is inherent in a women’s nature.20 
Unsurprisingly, the trace of  all of  these features is apparent in the official 
and popular discourse of  PKS pertaining to women.
As a political movement, PKS recognises the significant effect of  
17 Sherifa Zuhur, Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt 
(New York: State University of  New York Press, 1992), p.107.
18 Lisa Taraki, “Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women: Between 
Discourse and Practice,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, 1996, p. 141.
19 Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy and Whit Mason, Zelous Democrats: Islamism 
and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey (Australia: Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, 2008), p. iv-v.
20 Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, The Idea of  Women under Fundamentalist Islam (Florida: 
the University Press of  Florida, 2003), p. 219.
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women’s political participation, particularly in terms of  gaining votes 
in the election. In fact, they perceive the mobilisation of  women, who 
constitute half  of  the population, asessential to realise their social and 
political agenda for Islamist reform. PKS’s official stance on gender 
equality, nevertheless, is both ambivalent and contradictory. On the 
one hand, PKS views that creating an Islamic vicegerency (khilafah) is a 
collective duty for both men and women, which indicates equality and 
necessitates partnership between them. However, the women’s role and 
activism must be conducted within the Islamic framework and must be 
adjusted according to their distinct nature (fitrah). 
Because of  a women’s nature to nurture, PKS determines that 
the most important women’s role and function is in the management 
of  the family as ‘the pillar of  the nation.’ Although they emphasise the 
‘natural’ role of  women as mothers and wives, these roles are considered 
more political rather than domestic. Family is seen as the most important 
political, social and cultural unit of  the society, in which the division of  
labor between men and women is maintained because each has a different 
role to play in establishing the ideal Islamic society. This is reflected in 
the guidelines concerning the role and duty of  women in the PKS’s 
Basic Policies: 1) to optimise the woman’s role in all fields of  life, while 
preserving her dignity (harkat martabat wanita); 2) to establish a condition 
that is conducive to optimise woman’s political role, while maintaining the 
Islamic values and the natural disposition (fitrah); 3) to set equilibrium in the 
political rights; 4) to place women in strategic institutions in proportional 
ways, in terms of  quality and quantity; 5) to pay attention on women’s 
contemporary issues that develop among society; 6) To make family the 
institution of  political education.21
Instead of  asserting that men and women are equal, PKS view 
that men and women have a different nature, role, and rights, although 
they have the same value before God. Rebecca Foley referred this notion 
as gender equity instead of  gender equality.22 Gender equity centers 
on affirming women’s access to rights that are not necessarily equal to 
those of  men, and this differentiation does not imply a hierarchy in 
21 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Jakarta: 
DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2005). Author’s translation with additional emphasis. 
22 Rebecca Foley, “Muslim Women’s Challenges to Islamic Law,” International 
Feminist Journal of  Politics, vol. 6, no. 1, 2004, p. 59. 
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value.23 Thus, instead of  acknowledging that the problems of  women 
are the result of  gender disadvantage and discrimination, PKS view 
their problems as the result of  a societal process wherein proper Islamic 
principles are absent.
According to the PKS Development Policy Platform, the problem 
for Indonesian women is part of  multidimensional crisis that is rooted 
in the crisis of  morality. Without elaborating in details, the platform 
correlated the moral crisis with the global concern upon poverty, poor 
health, low education, violence against women, limited access to economic 
resources and decision-making and communal conflict, wherein women 
are the most vulnerable. To solve these problems, PKS argued in its 
platform that women’s empowerment in all aspect of  life is more urgent 
than the realisation of  gender equality. PKS proposes several solutions 
as follows, which mostly deal with practical instead of  strategic gender 
interest: 
First, to generate Indonesian women who are pious (bertakwa), as piety 
guarantees emotional and physical happiness, through giving women 
the rights to carry out their religious obligations and to obtain religious 
education, as well as funding their religious activities. Second, to create 
a prosperous life for Indonesian women (sejahtera), through financially 
supporting poor widows as well as subsidising the health care for women 
who are pregnant, giving birth, and breastfeeding; ensuring fair wage and 
friendly working hours and conditions for women as well as ensuring law 
enforcement on crimes against women. Third, to generate Indonesian 
women who are intelligent (cerdas), through providing women chance to 
obtain education and developing a curriculum that commensurate the women’s 
nature, as well as endorsing women’s entrepreneurship. Fourth, to generate 
Indonesian women who are empowered (berdaya), through improving 
women’s role in decision-making and accommodating their aspiration 
and interest, PKS encourages women to play role for the progress of  the 
nation, to take a critical stance against detrimental public policy, to preserve 
and defend their honor, and to refuse any kind of  exploitation. Fifth, to 
generate women who are cultured (berbudaya), through building Indonesia 
23 Azza Karam, “Women, Islamisms, and State: Dynamics of  Power and 
Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt,” in Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl (eds), Muslim 
Women and the Politics of  Participation: Implementing the Beijing Platform (Syracuse University 
Press, 1997), p. 19.
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as a religious nation and to develop the culture that raises women’s dignity.24
PKS considered women’s activism in the public sphere is 
indispensable because Allah has assigned both woman and man with the 
same duty to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil.25 For the purpose 
of  dakwah that can be manifested through social and political activism, 
women are allowed to leave their houses, to interact with the opposite sex, 
and to convey their messages before the public. Like any other Islamists, 
PKS use the historical examples of  women who participated in the public 
sphere to justify women’s activism. For instance, the classical narrative 
of  women (s\ah}a>bah) who pledged their political allegiance to the Prophet 
Muhammad (bay‘at) and women who participated in jihad by providing 
food and water for the combatants in the battlefield and taking care of  
their wounds. Nevertheless, women’s activism in the field of  dakwah 
and politics must be conducted in the consideration of  principles and 
requirements prescribed by the Central Sharia Board of  PKS as follows:
(1) Man’s leadership over woman, (2) Husband’s permission, (3) Cooperation 
among husband and wife in the management of  household (ta‘a>wun), (4) 
Party’s notification to the husband, (5) No dichotomy between woman’s role 
in dakwah and politics, and her role in the family, (6) Balance between family 
and dakwah (tawa>zun), and (7) the woman is allowed to hold a position 
in the legislative and executive levels, but not in the top level of  leadership 
(al-ima>ma al-uz}ma).26
This baya>n (explanation/guidance) on dakwah and political activities 
of  Muslim women clearly shows patriarchal considerations, which mainly 
determine the man as the leader, superior, and guardian of  woman. The 
unequal gender treatment is also evident here, wherein woman’s activism 
should meet the interest and approval of  her husband, while it is not 
the case with the man. Thus, a woman is not free in making choices 
and decisions, because her actions and movements depend largely on 
24 Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera: Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani yang Adil, Sejahtera dan Bermartabat, pp. 379-81. 
Author’s translation with additional emphasis.
25 This concept is known as ’amr ma‘ru>f  wa nahi an al-munkar derived from 
Qur’an 9: 71.
26 Dewan Syari’ah Pusat (DSP) PKS, Bayan DSP PKS no. 19/B/K/DSP-
PKS/1429 Tentang Aktivitas Dakwah dan Politik Muslimah, 2008. Author’s translation 
with additional emphasis. 
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her husband’s permission. It also emphasises a woman’s familial duty, 
wherein she is required to balance her role in the public sphere and her 
responsibility in the domestic sphere. The guidance conveys multiple 
expectations on woman:
“Islam does not want a woman to have a great role in public, to have 
high social status, to have a successful career, to have a lot of  academic 
titles, yet she cannot observe her main role and duty to be the partner 
for her husband and mother for her children. By contrast, it is not wise 
to waste the potency of  woman whose knowledge and skill is needed 
by the Muslim society (umma), yet this gift from Allah cannot be utilised 
because she only stays at home.”27
In order to solve this dilemma, PKS encourages cooperation 
between the husband and wife, particularly in the matter of  children’s 
education and household maintenance. Nonetheless, the extent of  
woman’s public activism is still limited, as she can hold any position as 
far as it is regarded to entail a real benefit for Muslim society with the 
exception of  being in the top leadership. PKS’s disapproval against a 
women’s leadership is based on their interpretation of  Qur’an (4:34): 
”Men are the leaders of  women, because Allah has made one of  them 
(men) to excel the other (women), and because they (men) spend of  their 
property. Therefore, the righteous women are obedient to Allah and guard 
(means that they do not cheat and they keep the secret and property of  
their husbands) in the husband’s absence, because Allah have guarded 
(them: Allah orders husbands to treat their wives well).”28
Based on this verse, PKS also maintain the traditional division of  
labor and determine a man’s duty to provide for his wife and children 
with financial support (nafkah). However, if  the wife works and earns 
money, she is entitled to her own wealth, while if  she wants to provide 
for her family, it is considered as charity (since it is above her prescribed 
duty). The consequence that can appear from such a division of  labor is 
that the man may curtail women’s freedom and mobility in public, while 
women -being financially dependent upon their husbands- may have 
limited access to decision making within their own household. Indeed, 
economic power is a necessary ingredient for female empowerment, 
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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as feminist Heidi Hartman argues that economic independence is an 
important determinant of  female autonomy.29
Women’s restrictions also tend to dominate the Islamist rhetoric, in 
which the ways women act, dress, and behave are deemed crucial in the 
reconstruction of  an appropriate Islamic order.30 Here, the PKS guidance 
includes restrictions on women’s activism in the public sphere based on 
their misogynist perception that women are the source of  fitnah (social 
disorder or chaos), who are sexually attractive and naturally seductive:
When a woman should become active in dakwah and politics, she must 
pay attention toward the Islamic ethics as follows: (1) The primary nature 
(fit}rah) and role of  woman is to be the mother for her children and the 
wife for her husband; (2) To wear the Islamic dress; (3) To avoid being 
alone with a non-relative member of  the opposite sex (khalwa); (4) Do not 
show her accessory and beauty off  (tabarruj); (5) Do not soften her voice 
sensually as she speak; (6) To control her gaze; (7) To uphold ethics in the 
communication (8) Do not shake hands with a member of  the opposite 
sex; (9) To guard her sanctity and honor (‘iffah) and to avoid the fitnah.31
This perspective is in conformity with the Islamist sexual discourse, 
in which unsatisfied male sexuality is considered a social danger and 
female seductive powers as conducive to fitnah or social anarchy and 
chaos.32 To maintain order and safeguard the sanctity of  the family and 
community, their sex drives must be controlled by removing the source 
of  temptation, which is enforced through gender segregation as well as 
sexual restrictions, which are mostly imposed upon women. 
On the other hand, to enhance the family unit, PKS affirmed 
polygamous marriage as part of  Islamic law (shari>‘a) and the tradition 
of  the Prophet (sunna). It is also deemed as being wise (hikmah) and as a 
solution for social and household problems. Before turning into the PKS, 
the Sharia Board of  PK issued specific explanation (baya>n) on polygamy 
29 Cited in Roksana Bahramitash, “Myths and Realities of  the Impact of  Political 
Islam on Women: Female Employment in Indonesia and Iran,” Development in Practice, 
vol. 14, no. 4, 2004, p. 509.
30 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith, “Women in Islam: the Mother 
of  All Battles,” in Suha Sabbagh (ed.), Arab Women between Defiance and Restraint (New 
York: Olive Branch Press, 2003), p. 137.
31 Dewan Syari’ah Pusat (DSP) PKS, Bayan DSP PKS.
32 Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society 
(Al Saqi Books, 1985), p. 45.
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(ta‘addud). It set up two loose requirements as follows: (1) capability of  
providing financial support; (2) fair in terms of  material and physical 
allotment. It also advised several ethics as follows: (1) straighten out one’s 
intention, wherein the objective of  marriage is for the sake of  dakwah 
instead of  fulfilling one’s lust; (2) discuss this matter with family; (3) give 
a good example, by not lying or oppressing his wife.33 
In sum, women are represented in PKS’s official and popular 
discourse as important actors who carry out various social functions, 
in which family is the most important function that necessitate their 
involvement. For this reason, women are responsible for guarding 
morality, specifically sexual morality, and to improve social welfare. 
Women also play a key political role in terms of  supporting the party’s 
policy through campaigns and demonstrations as well as a regeneration 
process that preserves the party’s viability and survival.34 Nevertheless, 
the rights to issue fatwa> is under male authority, that must be followed by 
all members including female ones who have limited access to decision 
making, for instance in the case of  polygamy. 
D. Gender Practice of  PKS: between Polity and Piety
In the 2009 election, PKS gained 7.88 % of  the popular vote or 
57 seats of  the total 560 seats at the Indonesian parliament, making it 
the fourth-largest party in the country as well as the biggest Islamic 
party.35 Burhanuddin Muhtadi argued that this electoral success was not 
only due to PKS’s strong brand image as the “Clean and Caring” party, 
but was also due to its cadres’ socialisation inside and outside of  the 
party’s constituencies. With a higher proportion of  female cadres, who 
constituted 57% out of  the total member, Muhtadi suggested that they 
played a key role both in the political socialisation and in the mobilisation 
of  mass supports.36 Unfortunately, women are not well represented 
in PKS’s structural institutions and its members of  parliament in the 
33 PKS, Bayan DSP PK no. 01/B/D/DS-PK/VII/1422 tentang Ta’adud/Poligami, 
2001, Author’s translation.
34 AD Kusumaningtyas, “Perempuan dalam Partai-partai Politik Peserta Pemilu 
2004: Representasi dan Pandangan Politik,” Master thesis presented in the University of  
Indonesia, 2005, p. 109.
35 http://partai.info/pemilu2009/ 
36 Muhtadi, “Islamism and Women in Politics,” p. 68.
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national, provincial and district levels. In the time of  PKS’s formation 
in 2002, only 6 out of  50 founders were women (12%). In 2009, PKS 
surpassed the 30% quota for female legislative candidates recommended 
in the Election law, wherein 212 out of  576 PKS’s candidates were 
female (36.6%).37 However, only 3 out of  57 (5%) of  the PKS legislators 
elected that year were female, indicating a lack of  support from the PKS 
leadership to put its female cadres as feasible candidates. Men dominate 
PKS’s political structure, wherein only 3 out of  44 members of  the PKS 
central executive board are female (7%), 2 of  them serve as the head and 
secretary of  the department of  women affairs.38 Despite having a large 
number of  well-qualified and politically talented female senior cadres, no 
PKS woman has a high public profile, suggesting that the party’s internal 
culture hinders women from attaining prominence.39
PKS women’s activities are mostly concentrated in the Department 
of  Women’s Affairs, which consists of  three divisions: (1) Division 
of  Family Affairs whose programs include pre-marital courses, family 
counseling, parenting classes, early education, and a public campaign on 
the importance of  building strong and happy familes, (2) Department of  
Women, Children and Family Studies whose programs include research 
and public advocacy on women, children and family issues as well as 
providing recommendations to related institutions and publications in 
the mass media. (3) Department of  Women’s Capacity Building whose 
programs includes leadership trainings and workshops for female cadres, 
networking with public figures and strategic elements of  society, and 
organising Local Posts for Justice Women (Pos Wanita Keadilan/POS-
WK). Here, the department’s vision mostly reflected the Islamist discourse 
on women as mar’ah usriyah (family women), whose main duty is to take 
care of  their families.
Women’s significant contribution for PKS is apparent through their 
involvement in POS-WK, which has been established in 5000 locations 
across the country, in order to gain voters rather than to empower women. 
The objectives of  POS-WK is as follows: first, to strengthen the image of  
PKS as a caring dakwah party; second, to recruit as many people as possible 
37 http://kanalpemilu.net/?q=node/151.
38 http://pk-sejahtera.nl/inilah-susunan-pengurus-tingkat-pusat-pks/ 
39 Anthony Bubalo, Greag Fealy and Whit Mason, Zelous Democrats, p. 67.
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to be the members and supporters of  the party; third, to nurture people’s 
trust in PKS as the leader of  society; fourth, to raise PKS female cadres 
as the leading figures among society. To attract female supporters, POS-
WK offers various programs like women’s Islamic study groups, social 
services and charities, religious education, book clubs, entrepreneurship 
and providing health care for mothers and children. The programs mainly 
focus on the practical gender interests such as access to childcare and 
healthcare rather than strategic gender interests to generate social gender 
changes. While the former can be attained through charity or income-
generation projects, the latter can be achieved through strengthening 
women’s feminist consciousness and their bargaining power to confront 
social and political discrimination.40
In terms of  public policy, although PKS are not the only political 
party or social organisation supporting the Anti Pornography and 
Pornographic Acts Bill (Undang-udang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, 
UUAPP), they have certainly been one of  its most prominent advocates. 
Since the linkage of  faith to modesty is essential to the Islamist argument, 
PKS became the main initiator and supporter of  the bill, which was 
controversial as it is seen by many feminists as an attempt to curtail women’s 
autonomy in controlling their bodies and freedom in choosing what to 
wear. PKS was its staunch promoter, inside and outside of  the parliament 
building, since they deemed (sexual) morality as the root for collective 
well-being.41 Gadis Arivia views that, in the discourse surrounding the 
bill, which previously including pornography and pornographic acts, 
women had become the focus of  improving Indonesia’s moral standard, 
as though they are both the cause and solution to the so-called moral 
crisis.42 The PKS Women Department’s vision to amplify women as 
‘the pillar of  the nation’, which is inspired by the Prophet’s saying that a 
nation’s excellence and decadence both depend upon women, also shows 
40 Sophie Richter-Devroe, “Gender, Culture, and Conflict Resolution in 
Palestine,” Journal of  Middle East Women’s Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, 2008, p. 42.
41 Norma Permata, “Islamist Party and Democratic Participation: Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998-2006,” Doctoral thesis presented in the University 
of  Munster Germany, 2008, p. 266. 
42 Cited in Lydia Trotter, “Islam, Women and Indonesian Politics: the PKS 
Challenge to Substantive Theories of  Democracy,” Master thesis presented in the 
University of  Sidney Australia, 2006, p. 39.
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how women are made the symbolic representation of  religious identity. 
According to PKS, UUAPP will protect women from sexual harassment 
and violence, in which they epitomize the Islamists’ view that women 
are responsible for causing immoral sexual desires in men, and hence, 
women must act and dress modestly in order to avoid encouraging men’s 
inappropriate sexual behavior.43
In her research on women’s political representation and views in 
Indonesian Islamic political parties, Kusumaningtyas categorised PKS as 
a party that is limitative upon the women’s rights.44 Adopting Islam as its 
foundation, PKS viewed that Islamic shari>‘a entails a set of  values and laws 
that must be implemented in daily life. Prohibition of  women’s leadership, 
permission of  polygamy, and restrictions on women’s activism are deemed 
as the logical consequences of  their understanding of  shari>‘a. Women 
are seen as the backbone of  society, whose main role concerns family 
care, societal education and moral guardianship. Various programs are 
proposed in order to guard morality, sexual morality in particular, through 
family institutions, public education and dress regulations. Consequently, 
the women’s rights and roles are limited to particular prescribed sectors. 
E. Conclusion
Like Islamists elsewhere, PKS’s gender discourse revolves around 
three interlinked elements of  faith, family, and state. Faith provides the 
instruction, the state provides the tools, and the family provides the 
building foundation for an Islamic system.45 In this regard, women are 
positioned as bearers of  religion and tradition, who preserve (sexual) 
morality and sustain (biological and social) continuity. For that reason, 
mechanisms and restrictions must be placed on a woman’s sexuality in 
order to safeguard her honor and dignity. Although the Islamist normative 
restriction on sexuality is applied to both sexes, in practice it is women 
who must maintain their modesty physically, emotionally, and socially. 
This is the reason why PKS, as a religious actor and movement (jam‘iyyah), 
are strict and dogmatist in their gender ideology.
43 Ibid.
44 Kusumaningtyas, Perempuan dalam Partai-partai Politik, p. 116.
45 Shahin Gerami, Women and Fundamentalism: Islam and Christianity (New York-
London: Garland Publishing, 1996), p. 31.
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As a political player, PKS has shown several transformations in 
their gender practice, reflecting intensive negotiation and contestation 
in the gender field. Previously, PKS female cadres were mostly working 
behind the scenes or engaged in the department of  women’s affairs or, 
at most, serving as a deputy or secretary in the PKS structure. Currently 
however, the central leadership is diversifying the roles of  female cadres. 
Female cadres who used to accept party decisions and policies as a given 
have begun to express their dissenting opinions and aspirations. The 
use of  a partition wall (h}ija>b) to segregate sexes in official meetings is 
no longer used in the central office, indicating symbolic but meaningful 
step in PKS gender attitude.46 
Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler argued that the 
transformations within Islamist parties are no more than a strategy to 
present the moderate image and to gain more votes.47 This pragmatism 
is also apparent in various PKS initiatives to reach broader female 
constituency, ranges from giving awards to prominent women figures 
considered as inspiring (some of  them are unveiled), to establishing 
thousands of  women support centers across the country through Pos 
Wanita Keadilan. PKS also fulfilled the 30% quota for female legislative 
candidates recommended in the election law, and supported female 
candidates for executive position in the regional elections, indicating 
their gender paradigm shift. Evidently, as jam‘iyyah, PKS is flexible and 
pragmatic in their gender policies. 
The internal dynamic between the conservative wing that are more 
ideological and the progressive wing that are more pragmatic has created 
ambiguity in PKS’s stance pertaining to gender issues. The ambivalence 
appears, for instance, in the controversial recommendation of  the PKS 
Governor of  West Java Ahmad Heryawan to make the traditional Jaipong 
dance less attractive (sensual) by removing its hip movements known as 
goyang, gitek, geol (3G). The female dancers must not wear strapless or see-
through costumes either, in conformity with the pornography laws. This 
case indicates PKS’s obsession in controlling women’s sexuality and moral 
46 Lanny Octavia, “Women and Islamism: Women’s Activism and Gender 
Perspective within Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party,” Master thesis presented in the 
University of  Exeter, United Kingdom, 2011, p. 52.
47 Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, “Who Opened the Window? 
Women’s Activism in Islamist Parties,” Comparative Politics, vol. 35, no. 3, 2003. 
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conduct as they acquire and exercise political power. Meanwhile, in the 
presidential election 2009, PKS deputy secretary Zulkieflymansyah said 
that the hearts of  PKS’s supporters were in favour of  Jusuf  Kalla-Wiranto 
whose wives wear headscarves. Therefore, PKS parliamentary chairman 
Mahfud Sidik advised the wives of  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Budiono 
to wear Islamic attires as well to boost their husbands’ appeals among 
Muslim voters and solidify the Party’s support. Here, PKS envisaged 
women’s dress code as the marker of  the ‘good’ society and utilised this 
‘religious’ vision further for their political interest. 
PKS’s preoccupation with family issues, however, follows a 
different direction from the feminists’ struggle of  making personal 
matters as political. In the formulation of  Anti Domestic Violence Law, 
PKS female member of  parliament Yoyoh Yusroh insisted in including 
the law under the complaint crimes (delik aduan/[Dutch] klachtdelict) instead 
of  the ordinary crimes (delik biasa/[Dutch] gewone delict). Consequently, 
domestic violence cannot be processed unless the victim reports the 
case to the police. Yusroh did not want the law to fall under the ordinary 
crime, wherein anyone who sees domestic violence can make a complaint 
and thus it will ruin the marriage. This stance is in direct contradiction 
with the feminist who adopted ‘zero tolerance’ to all forms of  violence.
The ambiguity above is a natural consequence of  the marriage 
between religion and politics. While religion emphasises amoral absolute, 
politics is all about compromise. In this context, women issues become 
the battlefield between the conservative wings who view religious moral 
principles as an absolute truth and non-negotiable, and the progressive 
wings who seek to accommodate democratic and humanist principles 
under the religious spirit and norms. In the end, the internal leadership’s 
vision and the external pressure for gender equality that constitutes 
substantial democracy will determine PKS’s direction in the future.
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